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Technology Selection and Commitment in
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McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712
INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau, 77305, France
krishnan@mail.utexas.edu • shantanu.bhattacharya@insead.fr
Selecting the right technologies to incorporate in new products is a particularly challengingaspect of new product deﬁnition and development. While newer advanced technologies
may offer improved performance, they also make the product development process more
risky and challenging. In this paper, we focus on the problem of technology selection and
commitment under uncertainty, a major challenge to ﬁrms in turbulent environments. We
argue that the “pizza-bin” approach of rejecting prospective technologies outright may not
serve ﬁrms well when the pressure to differentiate products is enormous. After motivating
the challenges and decisions facing ﬁrms using a real-life application from Dell Computer
Corporation, we formulate a mathematical model of a ﬁrm that must deﬁne its products in
the presence of technology uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm faces two options: (i) a proven
technology that is known to be viable and (ii) a prospective technology that offers superior
price to performance results but whose viability is not a fully certain outcome. To mini-
mize the impact of technology uncertainty, we consider two approaches to design ﬂexibility,
termed parallel path and sufﬁcient design, which allow the ﬁrm to concurrently develop its
products while the technology is being validated. Our analysis helps understand appropri-
ateness of the different ﬂexible design approaches. We illustrate our model with the Dell
portable computer example and note the managerial implications of our analysis.
(New Product Development; Design Flexibility; Technology Selection)
1. Introduction
The increasing emphasis on market leadership and
shareholder value creation have turned many a ﬁrm’s
attention to new product development as a source of
growth, renewal, and competitive advantage. Product
deﬁnition, the early phase of the product develop-
ment process involving the determination of the key
speciﬁcations of a product, has been shown to be crit-
ical to the success of a ﬁrm’s new product (Cooper
1993, Bacon et al. 1994). While the crucial role played
by product deﬁnition is increasingly recognized, how
to deﬁne the product amidst customer and technology
uncertainty remains largely an open question.
During the product deﬁnition phase, input data
and information about customer needs and emerg-
ing technologies are used to ﬁnalize key speciﬁcations
of the product such as its performance levels and
features. These speciﬁcations are important inputs
based on which subsequent downstream detailed
design and prototyping activities are carried out. To
minimize the adverse impact on these subsequent
downstream activities, it is often recommended that
the speciﬁcations be frozen early in the develop-
ment process (Cooper 1993). However, Bhattacharya
et al. (1998) studied the problem of product deﬁnition
under customer preference uncertainty, and found
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that in dynamic environments it is necessary for the
ﬁrm to tune its deﬁnition approach to the level of cus-
tomer preference uncertainty.
In this paper, we address the related problem of
product deﬁnition under technology uncertainty. One
of the key decisions made during the product deﬁ-
nition phase is the selection of component technol-
ogy that offers the product its ability to perform at
the level set in its speciﬁcations. Frequently, a devel-
opment team is faced with the choice of more than
one technological option. The team, in particular, may
consider a prospective technology that is not yet fully
proven but offers the potential of a superior level of
performance at the same or lower cost than the best
existing proven technological choice. Interestingly,
the technology selection decision in product deﬁni-
tion and development, despite its importance, has
not attracted adequate research attention. Clark and
Wheelwright (1993) describe an approach used at one
of Hewlett-Packard’s business units in the late 1980s,
called the pizza-bin approach. Products are developed
from “on-the-shelf” proven technologies, whose fea-
sibility must be completely proven before product
development commences. The pizza-bin approach
aims to reduce the risk inherent in the Product Devel-
opment (PD) process. However, by refusing to con-
sider promising prospective technologies that are not
yet fully proven, a ﬁrm may forego the chance to com-
mercialize new technologies ahead of competitors and
thereby differentiate its products.
Alternatively, the development team may choose
to remain ﬂexible and defer commitment to a spe-
ciﬁc technology, developing its products concurrently
with the validation of the prospective technology. The
“ﬂexibility” required to pursue an approach may be
obtained in one of the following ways. The team
may choose to invest in parallel project paths, each
of which develops the product for a certain technol-
ogy. To bound development expenses, the company
may decide to terminate the redundant paths as more
information becomes available. A second approach
involves overdesigning the product so that it would
function with all of the technological options. Both
these approaches involve additional costs that must
be weighed against the beneﬁts in deciding the proper
course of action. The costs, beneﬁts, and the decisions
faced by a PD team are illustrated by the following
real-life experience at Dell Computer Corporation.
1.1. Product Deﬁnition Under Technology
Uncertainty at Dell
In Fall 1993, a small “core team” of Dell Com-
puter’s product developers embarked on the design
of a new portable product to be launched to mar-
ket in 12 months. The pressure on the team was
intense because at that time Dell did not sell a
portable computer. Its earlier product was discon-
tinued because of “quality” problems. Dell’s target
customer-base—corporate customers—preferred to
buy from vendors with a complete product line, so
the lack of a portable product resulted in the loss of
market share to competitors. Given the background
of its prior portable product, the Dell development
team felt that an undifferentiated “me-too” product
was not enough to regain credibility and foothold
in the intensely competitive marketplace. During the
deﬁnition phase, the team was considering various
options to differentiate its products. Market research
showed that the top three features portable computer
customers cared about were price, processor speed,
and battery life. It was hard to differentiate based on
processor speed, dictated largely by Intel and shared
with all PC suppliers, and the company did not want
to compete on price. So, the PD team considered using
battery life as a differentiating feature.1
During this time-frame, the proven battery tech-
nology used by most PC ﬁrms was the nickel-metal-
hydride (NiHi) battery technology, which lasted less
than three hours and suffered from the “battery mem-
ory” problem (the battery would recharge only to a
fraction of the full level). On the horizon was a new
battery technology, called the lithium ion (LIon) tech-
nology being developed at Sony, which offered signif-
icantly higher battery density (or higher battery life
per unit weight) than the NiHi batteries. However, the
LIon technology was not yet completely proven for
usage in portable computers. In exceptional cases, the
battery was reported to be suffering from an “over-
charging problem,” in which lithium may separate
1 More details of this case example are presented in the Harvard
Business School case study, “Product Development at Dell Com-
puter Corporation” (Thomke et al. 1998).
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from the lithium ion if overcharged, potentially lead-
ing to an explosion. Sony had designed a workaround
circuit to prevent the overcharging problem and was
in the process of testing this new enhancement.
Dell had recently adopted a formal phase review
approach to product development, which required
a ﬁrm commitment to speciﬁcations at the end of
the deﬁnition phase. However the new technology
was not yet fully validated by the time of the def-
inition phase review. At this point, the team could
(a) stick with the proven NiHi technology, (b) com-
mit to the LIon (prospective) technology despite its
risks, or (c) decide to wait for more information and
defer commitment until a later time. However, wait-
ing for more information might delay the product
launch beyond the target launch date. The devel-
opment team could conceivably minimize/eliminate
delays in launch by concurrently developing the
product following two parallel paths or by overde-
signing the product while waiting for the technology
to be validated. The parallel path approach would
mean additional development expenditure, and the
more time the parallel paths are pursued, the greater
the expense. (In particular, the money outﬂows in a
typical product development project are back-loaded
due to investment in tooling and dies, so as the ﬁrm
delays terminating one of the development paths,
the cost of the project grows at an ever-increasing
rate.) A second option that would offer design ﬂex-
ibility would be to overdesign the product so that it
could function with either battery technology. How-
ever, overdesign of the product could increase the unit
variable cost of the product in production and cut into
the product’s gross margins.
1.2. Research Questions Addressed in
this Paper
The above example illustrates some of the challenges
in deﬁning products amidst technology uncertainty.
In this context, we seek to address the following ques-
tions:
1. When do prospective technologies deserve seri-
ous consideration in the PD process? When must a
ﬁrm not strictly adhere to the pizza-bin approach (of
rejecting unproven technology)?
2. If the ﬁrm chose to defer commitment to the
technology, what are the implications of the parallel
path and overdesign approaches for product develop-
ment effectiveness?
3. What impact does the ﬁrm’s risk aversion have
on its product deﬁnition approach?
We begin answering these questions in §2 by for-
mulating a simple model of product deﬁnition under
technology uncertainty. Our stylized model is aimed
more at generating insights than to serve as a deci-
sion support model. The model analyses in §§3 and 4
help characterize the appropriateness of the pizza-bin
approach and the implications of deferring com-
mitment. In §5, we relate our model back to the
Dell example, summarize the managerial insights,
and identify limitations and opportunities for further
research.
Our work adds to the growing body of litera-
ture focusing on the management of the product
development process, reviewed recently by Krishnan
and Ulrich (2001). In particular, the issues of uncer-
tainty and development ﬂexibility have been gaining
increasing attention in recent years (Iansiti 1995, Ward
et al. 1995, Kalyanaram and Krishnan 1997, Thomke
1997, Loch and Terweisch 1998). A few economists
have studied the impact of parallel path research
and development approaches, focusing more on the
number of parallel efforts rather than their effect on
product development decision making (Nelson 1961,
Arditti and Levy 1980). In a related paper, McCardle
(1985) has studied the adoption of uncertain tech-
nology, although more in the context of information
acquisition costs than in the domain of new product
development. Also related to our work is the paper
by Srinivasan et al. (1997) who argue that with the
new economics of product development (e.g., declin-
ing costs of prototyping), it may be optimal to select
the best design later in the process. Our model pre-
sented below reinforces these ﬁndings.
2. Model Conceptualization and
Formulation
Our attention is focused on a ﬁrm that develops
a product for use by a set of customers who pur-
chase the product primarily based on its performance
Management Science/Vol. 48, No. 3, March 2002 315
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and price. The product performance is due to one or
more core technologies that underlie the product. (For
example, in a portable computer, the core technologies
include the microprocessor technology, battery tech-
nology, display technology, memory technology, etc.)
Most ﬁrms that we have observed use minor variants
of the development review approach in which the
product is reviewed at periodic intervals prior to fur-
ther investments in development (Cooper 1993). For
the product being considered, let the ﬁrm’s nominal
product development cost be Cdev and nominal devel-
opment cycle length be Tdev completed in N periodic
managerial reviews spaced at equal distances. We
assume the development time and cost to be exoge-
nously speciﬁed.
We also assume that the ﬁrm is operating in an
industry with product life-cycle length TLf exoge-
nously determined by the market. However, we allow
for dynamic demand by modeling the fraction of the
product life-cycle demand sold by time t during the
life cycle 0 ≤ t ≤ TLf  to be described by the gen-
eral distribution function F t where F 0 = 0, and
F TLf  = 1. This helps us understand the impact of
the life-cycle demand on the ﬁrm’s technology selec-
tion decision. For instance, any delay in the launch
of the product would mean a proportional loss in
demand and revenues. If, for example, the ﬁrm intro-
duces the product tdel units of time into the life cycle,
it would lose the proportion of gross revenues repre-
sented by F tdel.
The ﬁrm seeks transient advantage by considering
a more recent technology, which we call the prospec-
tive (ps) technology, for its new product. Its decision
process differs from the pizza-bin process in the fol-
lowing manner. Instead of rejecting the ps technology
outright (without giving it any consideration as in the
pizza-bin approach), the ﬁrm deliberates its choice of
technology at the beginning of its development pro-
cess. To keep our attention focused on the insights, we
assume the ﬁrm considers for comparison the best-
existing proven technology option and only one ps
technology option (our analysis could be extended
to the case with multiple technologies). For the pur-
poses of this paper, a proven technology (denoted by
pv) is deﬁned as one in which the ﬁrm has 100%
conﬁdence level about its viability, based on labora-
tory tests, manufacturing feasibility studies, or track
record of the technology. A ps technology is, on the
other hand, one in which the ﬁrm has a lower conﬁ-
dence level about its viability than the pv technology
in the beginning of the development process. The ps
technology, while offering better performance or price
to performance capabilities, is in the process of being
validated and is not yet a pv technology.
Suppose that the ﬁrm expects to sell Dpv units of
the product with pv technology during the product
life cycle with a unit gross margin mpv (resulting in
expected gross life cycle proﬁt of Gpv = Dpv ∗mpv). If
the ﬁrm were to be successful in introducing a prod-
uct with the ps technology at the beginning of the
life cycle, it can expect to sell Dps units during the
life cycle with a unit gross margin of mps (resulting
in expected gross life cycle proﬁt of Gps = Dps ∗mps).
Because of the higher performance potential associ-
ated with the ps technology, we assume it can fetch
expected gross life-cycle proﬁt that is higher than the
pv technology Gps > Gpv, justifying the considera-
tion of the ps technology despite its risks. We conduct
our analysis with expected values of these param-
eters, later discussing sensitivity of our results to
the case when there is uncertainty surrounding these
parameters.
The development team’s estimate of the viability of
ps technology at time Tn is described by the parame-
ter vn. At the beginning of the development process,
the team’s (prior) estimate of the viability of ps tech-
nology is given by v0. As the process unfolds, more
information arrives from the ﬁeld tests of the ps tech-
nology that we assume helps the team update its pri-
ors in a Bayesian manner.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the begin-
ning of the development process, the development
team evaluates both the pv and ps technologies for
their effect on expected proﬁts based on its prior esti-
mate of viability of the ps technology, v0. Following
this assessment, the team may decide to commit to
one of the technologies. It may decide to commit to
neither technology at this point, continue to collect
more information about the ps technology, and defer
the decision about commitment until the next devel-
opment phase review. The new information helps the
316 Management Science/Vol. 48, No. 3, March 2002
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development team update its priors about the viabil-
ity of the ps technology and form a posterior estimate
that can be used to make the technology commitment
decision. When the ﬁrm defers commitment, it tries to
minimize the impact on its time to market by devel-
oping the product concurrently and by adopting a
ﬂexible approach as described in the next subsection.
If the ﬁrm decides to commit to the ps technology at
time Tn <Tdev, and ﬁnds closer to launch that the ps
technology is not viable, there is a development cost
and time penalty associated with reverting to the pv
technology. We model that reverting to the pv tech-
nology results in a development cost penalty Cdel and
time penalty tdel. For the analysis in §3, we model Cdel
to be equal to CdevTdev − Tn/Tdev and the launch
time delay tdel to be equal to Tdev−Tn. Here  repre-
sents the coefﬁcient of reversion to the pv technology from
the ps technology on the time dimension, and  rep-
resents the coefﬁcient of reversion to the pv technology on
the cost dimension, after commitment has been made
at Tn and the design tailored to the ps technology for
the rest of the development cycle Tdev − Tn. These
coefﬁcients of reversion capture the effect of learning
from design iterations. It is to be expected that the
coefﬁcients of reversion are inﬂuenced by the prod-
uct architecture—the more modular the product archi-
tecture, the smaller the coefﬁcients of reversion. Our
analysis can be easily extended to more general rever-
sion time and cost delay functions. As stated before,
the launch time delay tdel results in the loss of sales in
accordance with the dynamic demand function F tdel.
We begin by assuming the ﬁrm is risk neutral, and
consider the effect of risk aversion in §3. To stay
focused on design ﬂexibility issues, we also assume
that the market segment considered is homogeneous
in its preference and reservation prices for product
performance.
2.1. Flexible Design Approach: Parallel Path
The ﬁrst ﬂexible design approach we consider is the
parallel path approach in which the ﬁrm pursues mul-
tiple parallel paths to design the product with a spe-
ciﬁc technology choice in mind for a period Tn <Tdev.
(For simplicity, we consider just two parallel paths
here, but our analysis can be extended to more paths.)
We assume that the development cost is increasing
and convex in the time of development. The convex
function is justiﬁed based on increasing tooling costs
as the development delay increases, and has been
used in prior research (Graves 1989, Bhattacharya
et al. 1998).
Cdev = CTdev C ′ > 0 C ′′ > 0 (1)
The additional cost of investing in the second par-
allel path till time Tn Cn is given by:
Cn = CTn (2)
The second path is pursued in parallel, however we
do not assume any economies of scale in pursuing it.
If the ﬁrm pursues the parallel path approach until
time Tn and then decides to commit to either of the
technologies with a posterior viability of n, its net
proﬁt of choosing proven (pv) and prospective (ps)
technologies at time Tn are given as follows.
pvPPn vn = expected proﬁt from choosing pv
technology at Tn using parallel path
= GpvF Tdev+vn	Gps1−F Tdev−Cdev

+ 1−vnGpv1−F Tdev−Cdev−CTn
= Gpv−Cdev−CTn
+vn	Gps−Gpv1−F Tdev−Cdev
 (3)
The above expression reﬂects the fact that even if
the ﬁrm chose the pv technology at time Tn, it pos-
sesses the option to follow up after launch with a new
product based on the ps technology (if it proves to
be viable at the time of launch). For model tractabil-
ity, we assume that (a) the ﬁrm waits to follow up
with ps technology until launch after committing to
pv technology, and (b) following up with a new prod-
uct based on the ps technology takes the entire Tdev
units of time during which the ﬁrm sells the product
based on pv technology and captures proﬁt given by
ﬁrst term GpvF Tdev. The second term, vnGps1−
F Tdev−Cdev, represents the net proﬁt from launch-
ing the follow-up product with ps technology (which
happens with a probability vn), and the third term
1−vnGpv1− F Tdev depicts the proﬁt from stay-
ing with the pv technology during the remainder of
the life cycle. The ﬁnal term Cdev +CTn denotes
Management Science/Vol. 48, No. 3, March 2002 317
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the development cost incurred in the parallel path
approach. However, the above expression is only for
the case when the follow-up product is economically
viable. This is the case when:
F Tdev <
[
1− Cdev
Gps−Gpv
]

We assume this condition is satisﬁed in the body of
the paper. In an appendix available on the Manage-
ment Science website,2 we consider the simpler case
when this condition is not satisﬁed and no follow-up
product is launched.
The proﬁt from choosing the prospective technol-
ogy is as follows:
psPPn vn = expected proﬁt from choosing ps
technology at Tn using parallel path
= vnGps+ 1−vnGpv1−F tdel−Cdel
− Cdev+CTn
= Gpv−Cdev−CTn−GpvF tdel−Cdel
+vnGps−Gpv+Cdel+GpvF tdel (4)
Again, the ﬁrst term vnGps denotes the proﬁt
from the ps technology, while the second term
1−vnGpv1−F tdel−Cdel captures the chance that
the ﬁrm may have to revert to the pv technology with
the term Cdel depicting the reversion cost. In the linear
case, the reversion costs Cdel are set to be equal to
Cdev1−vn
Tdev−Tn
Tdev
to reﬂect the dependence on the time of commitment.
If the ﬁrm delays commitment, the costs of reversion
are lower because less work has to be reversed.
2.2. Flexible Design Approach:
Sufﬁcient Design (SD)
The second ﬂexible development approach we model
is termed sufﬁcient design (SD) because the design is
sufﬁcient (adequate) for the product to function with
both technologies. In this approach, the product is
overdesigned in that the decision is made early on
to deﬁne the architecture and the product package
2 mansci.pubs.informs.org
such that both technologies can ﬁt in. The effect of
this change is to reduce the gross margins because
of the increased variable cost and/or decreased prod-
uct attractiveness. The gross margins decrease from
Gps to Gps for the ps technology and from Gpv to Gpv
for the pv technology. SD’s advantage is that if the
ﬁrm picks ps technology and ﬁnds that it is not viable
at the time of launch, the cost of reversion is zero.
However, it might require additional and more skilled
development resources to identify a sufﬁcient design,
we model the development cost for SD to be Cdev (in
general, Cdev > Cdev). The proﬁt expressions from fol-
lowing the SD approach are as follows.
pvSDn vn = expected proﬁt from choosing pv
technology at Tn using SD
= GpvF Tdev+vn
[
Gps1−F Tdev
]
+ 1−vnGpv1−F Tdev− Cdev
= Gpv− Cdev
+vn
[
Gps−Gpv1−F Tdev
]
 (5)
With probability vn, the ﬁrm will launch a follow-
up product that can command a gross proﬁt of Gps.
Because of the effort invested in SD, the additional
effort involved in launching a follow-up product is
zero. The net proﬁt earned by this follow-up prod-
uct is vn	Gps1− F Tdev
. The expected proﬁt from
choosing ps technology under SD equals the sum of
the net proﬁt from the ps technology vnGps − Cdev,
and the proﬁt from reversion to the pv technology
1−vnGpv.
psSDn vn = expected proﬁt from choosing ps
technology at Tn using SD
= vnGps− Cdev+ 1−vnGpv
= Gpv− Cdev+vnGps−Gpv (6)
3. Model Analysis
We now examine when a ﬁrm would consider a ps
technology without rejecting it outright. Next, we
compare the implications of the parallel path and SD
approaches to design ﬂexibility. Finally, we study how
the ﬁrm’s risk aversion inﬂuences its decisions under
uncertainty.
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3.1. Prospective Technology (ps): To Consider or
Not to Consider
To ﬁnd when the ps technology deserves considera-
tion, we simply compare the proﬁt expressions from
the pv and ps technology at the beginning of the
development process. At this point, the ﬁrm has not
chosen the PP or the SD schemes, so the cost of devel-
opment is essentially Cdev. However, if the ﬁrm picks
the ps technology, with a probability of 1−v0 it will
incur an additional cost and time penalty to revert to
the pv technology. Setting the cost of reversion to be
Cdev and the development time delay to be Tdev, the
proﬁt expressions are as follows.

pv
0 v0 = expected proﬁt from choosing pv
technology at the beginning
= GpvF Tdev+v0	Gpv1−F Tdev−Cdev

+1−v0Gpv1−F Tdev−Cdev
= Gpv−Cdev
+v0	Gps−Gpv1−F Tdev−Cdev
 (7)

ps
0 v0 = expected proﬁt from choosing ps
technology at the beginning
= v0Gps+ 1−v0	Gpv1−F Tdev

−Cdev1+ 1−v0
= Gpv−Cdev−GpvF Tdev−Cdev
+v0Gps−Gpv+Cdev+GpvF Tdev (8)
Comparing the expected proﬁt expressions above,
we obtain a condition for the ﬁrm to consider the ps
technology by setting ps0 v0≥ pv0 v0 or if:
v0 ≥ vthr
= Cdev+GpvF Tdev
Gps−GpvF Tdev+Cdev+Cdev+GpvF Tdev
 (9)
While the expression above is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient for the ﬁrm to consider the ps technology,
it could be argued that a rational ﬁrm giving serious
consideration to the ps technology would, at a mini-
mum, expect the proﬁts from the ps technology at the
outset to exceed the proﬁt from the pv technology. In
that sense, the above expression is a surrogate for nec-
essary and sufﬁcient conditions (that depend on sub-
sequent information received as modeled in the next
section), and provides a “threshold” value of viability
above which the prospective technology is likely to
be considered. On the basis of this threshold, the ﬁrm
would consider the ps technology, when the gross
proﬁt of the ps technology Gps is higher and when the
gross proﬁt of the pv technology Gpv is lower. Also,
vthr in (9) is increasing in the coefﬁcients of rever-
sion  and . As the reversion penalties get increas-
ingly expensive, the ﬁrm is less likely to consider the
ps technology to minimize reversion costs (conﬁrm-
ing intuition). Interpreting the relationship of vthr to
the demand life cycle represented by F TdevTdev, and
the cost of development Cdev is more involved, and
depends on the relative values of proﬁtability of the
pv and ps technologies as seen below. For the cost of
development, Cdev, we can state the following.
Result 1a. When
Gps−Gpv
Gpv
<
FTdev
F Tdev

the threshold viability vthr is monotone decreasing
in Cdev.
Result 1b. When
Gps−Gpv
Gpv
>
FTdev
F Tdev

the threshold viability vthr is monotone increasing in
Cdev.
For the demand life cycle represented by F Tdev, we
can state the following:
Result 1c. When
Gps−Gpv
Gpv
<
[
1
vthr
−1
]
F Tdev
F Tdev

the threshold viability vthr is monotone increasing in
F Tdev.
Result 1d. When
Gps−Gpv
Gpv
>
[
1
vthr
−1
]
F Tdev
F Tdev
 (10)
the threshold viability vthr is monotone decreasing in
F Tdev.
In other words, when the relative difference in
proﬁtability between the two technologies is smaller
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than the effect of the ratio of the coefﬁcients of rever-
sion (
Gps−Gpv
Gpv
<
FTdev
F Tdev
)

a smaller nominal cost of development Cdev leads to a
smaller region of consideration for the ps technology.
However, the opposite is the case when the relative
difference in proﬁtability between the two technolo-
gies is large (
Gps−Gpv
Gpv
<
FTdev
F Tdev
)
the ﬁrm increases its consideration of ps technology
when the cost of development is small.
The physical interpretation of this result is some-
what involved and is as follows. When the relative
difference in proﬁtability between the pv and ps tech-
nologies is small, the cost of development weighs
heavily on the ﬁrm. Higher cost of development
favors reversion activities more than follow up (which
involves doubling of the development costs), prompt-
ing the ﬁrm to more seriously consider the ps technol-
ogy. However, when the relative difference in proﬁt-
ability between the pv and ps technologies is large,
the ﬁrm opts to follow up with a product offering the
ps technology, and hence, the ﬁrm favors considering
the pv technology at the outset, increasing the value
of the threshold viability.
Similarly, in the case of the life-cycle demand, the
decision to choose between the pv and ps technologies
at the beginning of the deliberation process is gov-
erned by the trade-off between net beneﬁts of rever-
sion and follow-up activities (done to follow a prod-
uct based on pv technology with a product made of
the ps technology). If the net gains from reversion
exceed the net beneﬁt from follow up, the ﬁrm is
likely to consider at the outset the ps technology for a
greater range of the threshold viability values.
When the demand gets more front-loaded in the life
cycle, the net beneﬁts from both reversion as well as
follow up are reduced because of the loss of revenues.
However, the ratio of this reduction in net beneﬁt
from reversion to follow up is inversely proportional
to Gps −Gpv/Gpv. When the fractional improve-
ment in gross proﬁtability due to the ps technology
Gps −Gpv/Gpv is small, the reduction in net bene-
ﬁt from reversion exceeds the reduction in net beneﬁt
from follow up, causing the ﬁrm to gravitate towards
the pv technology (and use the follow-up approach in
case the ps technology is available at launch time). The
ps technology in this case is not attractive enough to
incur the costs of reversion. However, when the ratio
Gps −Gpv/Gpv is high, the follow-up approach suf-
fers more than reversion from front-loaded demand,
leading the ﬁrm to increase the region of considera-
tion of the ps technology. Now, the ps technology is
attractive enough to overcome the costs of reversion.
From the chain rule, we can see that the length
of the development cycle affects the choice of tech-
nologies in a fashion similar to that of F Tdev. Thus,
when the relative difference in proﬁtability between
the two technologies is small, a shorter development
cycle increases the region of consideration of the ps
technology, because the costs of reversion are low-
ered by the shorter development cycle (and follow-up
costs cannot be justiﬁed for the marginally proﬁtable
ps technology). However, when the relative difference
in proﬁtability between the two technologies is large,
a shorter development cycle decreases the region
of consideration of the ps technology, because the
demand lost during the follow-up period is reduced
due to the shortness of the length of the development
cycle.
In the above analysis, we assumed that some of the
variables, like the payoffs Gps and Gpv are known and
deterministic. These assumptions can be relaxed in
the model, however, it is difﬁcult to obtain analytical
solutions for problems with two stochastic variables.
Numerically, we can show that if a ﬁrm is risk averse,
it will have a higher threshold value to consider the
ps technology, as the payoff from the pv technology
can be estimated with a much higher degree of accu-
racy. Since the payoff from the ps technology (Gps)
has a higher degree of uncertainty, a risk-averse ﬁrm
will discount this payoff to a larger extent. Similarly,
if the cost of development for the ps technology is
uncertain, the ﬁrm will have a higher threshold value
compared to the case when the cost of development is
known and deterministic, this result also has a similar
intuition. We now turn our attention to the compari-
son of the two ﬂexible approaches.
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4. Analysis of the Different
Design Flexibility Approaches
The technology deliberation process beneﬁts from the
real time information available about the ps technol-
ogy from laboratory and ﬁeld tests. We model that the
ﬁrm begins with a prior estimate v0 of the viability
of the ps technology, and updates its prior informa-
tion with signals from the ﬁeld tests in a Bayesian
manner. Let the ﬁrm’s posterior estimate of the via-
bility of ps technology at time tn be denoted by vn. It
is common in literature to assume that the prior and
signals form a conjugate prior, so that the posterior is
of the same distribution as the prior (McCardle 1985).
Due to the nature of the parameters, we assume that
the prior estimate v0 of the viability of the ps technol-
ogy is from a Beta distribution (between 0 and 1 with
parameters  and ), and the signals are taken from a
Bernoulli distribution—a favorable (unfavorable) sig-
nal indicating the success (failure) of the technology
in ﬁeld tests.
At any point in the development process, if the
team makes the decision to commit to one type of
technology, it will commit to that technology which
fetches the greater amount of expected proﬁt. How-
ever, the team also has the option to continue to
collect more information from the technology sup-
plier and defer the commitment decision as late as
possible or at least until the next review. It is pos-
sible that the new information might increase the
certainty of available information thereby increasing
the expected proﬁt. However, continuing to collect
more information also means that the development
team spends more time pursuing a parallel path or
an SD approach, increasing either the ﬁxed cost of
development or reducing its margins. Whichever ﬂex-
ible approach the team follows, the optimal course
of action for a team at review n with posterior prob-
ability vn of the viability of the ps technology can be
formulated as a dynamic program as follows. Let:
nvn = return from commitment to
the most proﬁtable technology
at review n,
Rn+1vn = return from optimal policy
at review (n+1) given vn (11)
at review n
Rnvn = return from following the optimal
policy at review
n=Max	nvn Rn+1vn

where Rn+1vn= vn ·Rn+1v+n + 1−vn ·Rn+1v−n .
Here, v+n denotes the updated value of vn when a
positive signal arrives, and v−n denotes the updated
value of vn when a negative signal arrives. This is
because vn is also the probability the ﬁrm expects to
receive a positive signal about the viability of ps tech-
nology at stage n. For a Beta-Bernoulli conjugate pair
with parameters  and , they simplify to:
v+n =
vn · ++n+1
++n+1  v
−
n =
vn · ++n
++n+1 
When the ﬁrm chose to follow the SD approach, we
have:
RSDn vn=Max
(
pvSDn vn
psSD
n vn RSDn+1vn
)

(12)
The expression for parallel path (PP) can be written in
a similar fashion by substituting PP for SD. The opti-
mal course of action at review n depends on which
alternative provides the greatest expected proﬁt: com-
mitment to pv technology, commitment to ps technol-
ogy, or continuation of the deliberation and informa-
tion collection process. Accordingly, the expression for
Rnvn compares these three proﬁt terms, with the last
term Rn+1vn denoting the beneﬁt of continuing to
collect more information. Given vn at review n, the
next piece of information will be favorable with prob-
ability vn (indicating that the ps technology functions
to speciﬁcations in market conditions), and with prob-
ability 1− vn, the next signal will be unfavorable.
Implicit in the above formulation is the modeling
assumption that once the ﬁrm picks one of the ﬂex-
ible design approaches, it sticks to the approach. At
the beginning the ﬁrm must choose between outright
commitment to the pv or ps technology and the PP
or SD approaches. The dynamic programming equa-
tion for the initial decision (on whether to commit or
continue) is as follows.
R0v0=Max
(

pv
0 v0
ps
0 v0 RSD1 v0 RPP1 v0
)

(13)
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4.1. Analysis of Sufﬁcient Design
Among the two approaches to design ﬂexibility, SD
is the easier one to analyze. It is interesting to note
that the marginal value of new information collected
under SD is increasing in time, due to which com-
mitment will happen as late as possible (see Result
2 below). However, after the choice is made to pur-
sue the SD option, the marginal cost of collecting new
information is zero under SD, so the ﬁrm need not
worry about delaying commitment. In theory, the ﬁrm
may ﬁt either technology into its product, and can
even offer more than one version of the product in a
diverse market using the same product design.
Result 2. The marginal value of positive informa-
tion in the SD approach is positive until the point
of launch, making it optimal to delay the point of
commitment as much as possible. The proof of the
result follows directly from Expressions (5) and (6) in
§2.2. It is clear that the proﬁt is monotone increas-
ing in the team’s viability estimate, and a positive
signal increases the viability estimate. Although the
marginal increase in expected proﬁt is decreasing in
time, a positive signal does contribute to an increase
in expected proﬁt until the point of launch. This is due
to the fact that there is no marginal cost associated
with the SD approach. The ﬁrm may therefore com-
mit at the point of launch or, if possible, even beyond.
Unlike the SD approach, the parallel path approach,
which we now consider, involves a marginal cost of
pursuit.
4.2. Analysis of Parallel Path (PP)
If the ﬁrm follows the parallel path (PP) approach,
the proﬁts when it commits to either the pv or ps tech-
nology are as in Expressions (3) and (4). They are of
the form F PP −CTn+APPvn where F PP and APP are
time invariant for the pv technology, and time vari-
ant for the ps technology. For the pv technology (see
Expression (3)), FPP and APP are given by:
F pvPP =Gpv−Cdev
and
ApvPP = 	Gps −Gpv1−F Tdev−Cdev

For the ps technology (see Expression (4)), F pp and App
are given by:
F psPP = Gpv−Cdev−GpvF tdel−Cdel
and
ApsPP = Gps −Gpv+Cdel+GpvF tdel
Let
APP = ApsPP −ApvPP
= Gps −GpvF Tdev+Cdev+Cdel+GpvF tdel
We have left the terms tdel and Cdel generally, but
the linear forms assumed in §2 can be substituted for
them to achieve simplicity.
Note that although the ﬁrm does not pay an explicit
cost for the information collected in our model, it does
incur the cost of pursuing an additional path for one
more phase. As mentioned earlier, the development
cost function is convex due to the increased invest-
ments later in the development process. This addi-
tional development cost of pursuing the second path
for one more period is denoted as CPPn and is given
by: CPPn = CTn+1−CTn.
Suppose that the ﬁrm’s nominal development pro-
cess is made up of N equally spaced managerial
reviews. We now examine if one of the PP can be ter-
minated before all N reviews are completed with a
beta distribution for the prior and a Bernoulli distri-
bution for incoming information.
Result 3. Under the PP development approach, the
ﬁrm will terminate one of the paths at the ﬁrst point
where the
variancevn
meanvn
≤ a critical value  (14)
or at review n if ∃n 1≤ n≤ N for which
Cdel+GpvF tdel
(
+N −1
++N −1
)
< CPPn +

++N · Cdev+ Gps −GpvF Tdev
+ 
++N −1 · ++N · Gps −Gpv (15)
where
 =
(
CPPn − +N++N · Cdev + Gps −GpvF Tdev+ ++N Cdel
)
ApvPP
 (16)
The proof proceeds as follows. We show ﬁrst that the
net beneﬁt of new information is either decreasing in
time or always negative beyond a certain point if the
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KRISHNAN AND BHATTACHARYA
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condition above is satisﬁed while following the PP
development approach. In the former case, if the net
beneﬁt of the PP approach becomes negative at some
point in time during the product development pro-
cess, the ﬁrm should immediately converge to one of
the technologies, because all future information can-
not improve the expected proﬁt from the current lev-
els. Similarly, in the latter case, the ﬁrm should com-
mit at the point the net beneﬁt of information turns
negative.
To determine the net value of new information,
we must consider both positive and negative infor-
mation. It can be intuitively seen (and also shown
mathematically quite easily) that the value of the new
information that does not cause the ﬁrm to change
its decision from one type of technology to the other
is decreasing in time (McCardle 1985). Even if such
information increases or decreases the value of the
ﬁrm’s estimate of viability, the marginal change in
the estimate due to new information decreases with
time, and the ﬁrm incurs the additional cost of the
PP, which is increasing in time. However, the value of
new information that causes a change in the decision
is more involved. There are two possibilities:
(a) Negative information may cause the ﬁrm to
choose the pv technology without which the ﬁrm
would have chosen the ps technology.
(b) Positive information may cause the ﬁrm to
choose the ps technology without which the ﬁrm
would have chosen the pv technology.
Consider Case (a). The value of the new informa-
tion  is given by:
 = F pvPP −F psPP +v−n ApvPP −vnApsPP
− (CTn+1−CTn)
= FPP −CPPn + v−n −vnApsPP −v−n APP
where FPP = F pvPP − F psPP and APP = ApsPP −
ApvPP . In the above expression, FPP equal to Cdel +
GpvF tdel is decreasing in time (later the time of
commitment smaller the reversion penalty), and Cppn
is increasing in time at a convex rate. Notice that
the last two terms in the above expression v−n −
vnA
psPP−v−n APP are increasing in time, but they
are always negative, since ApsPP and App are always
positive. Commitment is guaranteed through new
information not adding positive value when the fol-
lowing condition is satisﬁed:
FPP − 	CTn+1−CTn
+ v−n −vnApsPP
−v−n APP < 0
FPP < 	CTn+1−CTn
+ vn−v−n ApsPP
+v−n APP
Cdel+GpvF tdel < CPPn +v−n
{
Cdel+GpvF tdel+Cdev
+Gps −GpvF Tdev
}
+ vn
++n+1 Gps −Gpv+Cdel+GpvF tdel
The left-hand side of the above equation decreases in
n. We can get a sufﬁcient condition by substituting the
right-hand side with a minimum value for all stages.
(If this condition is satisﬁed for a particular n, it is
satisﬁed for all future phases.) The minimum value
of v−n is achieved when all the signals received are
negative, which corresponds to
v−n =

++N
Under these circumstances, the minimum value of
vn
++n+1 =

++N −1 · ++N
We get:
Cdel+GpvF tdel
<
(
CPPn +

++N
×{Cdel+GpvF tdel+Cdev+Gps−GpvF Tdev}
+ 
++N−1·++N
×{Gps−Gpv+Cdel+GpvF tdel}
)

Cdel+GpvF tdel
(
+N−1
++N−1
)
<
(
CPPn +

++N ·Cdev+Gps−GpvF Tdev
+ 
++N−1·++N ·Gps−Gpv
)

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Now consider Case (b). The value of the new infor-
mation  is given by:
 = F psPP−F pvPP+v+n ApsPP−vnApvPP
−[CTn+1−CTn]
= −[CTn+1−CTn]+v+n −vnApvPP
+v+n APP−FPP
The ﬁrst three terms of the right-hand side of the
above expression are decreasing in n.  is negative
in the following case:(
v+n −vn
)
<
CTn+1−CTn−v+n APP+FPP
ApvPP
<CPPn −
+N
++N
·{Cdev+Gps−GpvF Tdev+Cdel+GpvF tdel}
+Cdel+GpvF tdel/ApvPP 
Let Sn denote the number of positive signals that have
arrived until review n. Then
(
v+n −vn
) = +Sn+1
++n+1 −
+Sn
++n
= +n−Sn
++n+1++n =
varvn
meanvn

Because for a Beta distribution
varvn=
+Sn+n−Sn
++n+1++n2
and
meanvn=
+Sn
++n 
By taking the minimum value of tdel, the point of con-
vergence is thus bounded by:
varvn
meanvn
≤ where
 = C
PP
n − +N++N Cdev+Gps−GpvF Tdev+ ++NCdel
ApvPP

Given the above result, how should the ﬁrm decide
at the beginning of the development process between
PP and SD approaches? It can be shown that the ratio
of variance to mean at review n is related directly to
the ratio of variance to mean at review 0 (beginning
of the development process).
varvn
meanvn
= varv0
meanv0
1
1+  n
++1 

so the ﬁrm can make the decision based on the ratio
of the variance to mean at the beginning of the devel-
opment process. In particular, if the ratio of variance
to mean is low, the ﬁrm is better off picking the PP
approach, otherwise it would prefer to choose the SD
approach (which entails no marginal cost of delibera-
tion). Clearly, the exact decision would depend on the
value of other parameters.
4.3. Effect of Firm’s Risk Aversion
The above analysis has assumed a risk-neutral ﬁrm.
In practice, ﬁrms are risk averse due to which they
may be more reluctant to consider unproven tech-
nology. What is the effect of the ﬁrm’s risk aversion
on product deﬁnition under technology uncertainty?
Since the SD approach does not involve a marginal
cost of pursuit once the approach has been chosen,
we consider the impact of risk aversion on the par-
allel path approach. For tractability, we assume that
the ﬁrm has an absolute risk aversion of the quadratic
form, i.e., we assume that the payoff of w to the ﬁrm
is of the form of Uw=−a−w2 (Pratt et al. 1995).
The risk-averse ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the cer-
tainty equivalent of its expected proﬁt, which would
be lower than the proﬁt anticipated by the risk-neutral
ﬁrm. The effect of risk aversion is, in general, to lead
the ﬁrm to choose the pv technology because of its
lower uncertainty. But risk aversion also has implica-
tions for when the ﬁrm terminates the PP approach,
as in Result 4 below (the proof is available as an
appendix from the authors).
Result 4. Under PP, the risk-averse ﬁrm will con-
verge earlier (later) than a risk-neutral ﬁrm, when the
viability of the ps technology is above (below) a criti-
cal value.
We now consider the managerial implications of
our analysis.
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5. Model Implications and
Managerial Insights
The ﬁrst ﬁnding from our analytical results is that
a ﬁrm should not always reject a ps technology out-
right, given the ability to differentiate the product
and increase gross margins. Clearly, the more prof-
itable the ps technology or the smaller the coefﬁcient
of reversion, the more likely the ﬁrm would be to con-
sider the ps technology. The impact of the demand
intensity function, cost of development and the length
of the development cycle on the region of consider-
ation of the ps technology are quite interesting. As
explained in §3.1, the exact relationship depends on
the difference in proﬁtability between the pv and ps
technologies. When the relative difference in prof-
itability between the two technologies is small, front-
loaded demand during the product life cycle and
smaller nominal cost of development lead the ﬁrm to
a smaller region of consideration of the ps technology.
However, the opposite is the case when the relative
difference in proﬁtability between the two technolo-
gies is large. This is due to the trade-off between net
beneﬁts of reversion and follow-up activities. If the
net gains from reversion exceed the net beneﬁt from
follow up, the ﬁrm increases consideration of ps tech-
nology. When the demand gets more front-loaded in
the life cycle, the net beneﬁts from both reversion as
well as follow up are reduced because of the loss of
revenues. When the improvement in gross proﬁtabil-
ity due to the ps technology is small, the reduction
in net beneﬁt from reversion exceeds the reduction in
net beneﬁt from follow up, causing the ﬁrm to grav-
itate towards the pv technology. However, when the
improvement in gross proﬁtability due to the ps tech-
nology is large, the follow-up approach suffers more
than reversion from front-loaded demand, leading the
ﬁrm to increase the region of consideration of the ps
technology.
The analytical result on the effect of the different
approaches to design ﬂexibility, although based on a
Beta prior, offers useful insights. We ﬁnd that despite
the fact that the SD approach involves an added cost
of development, there is no marginal cost associated
with collecting information, so the optimal point of
commitment occurs as late as possible. On the other
hand, the PP approach has a signiﬁcant marginal cost
associated with deliberating—the cost can increase at
an increasing rate with time due to the investments
in tooling made later in the development process. It is
important to reach convergence (terminate one of the
PP) earlier in the development process. Our results
show that, under the modeling assumptions, when
the ratio of variance to mean of viability falls before
a critical value, one of the PP is likely to terminate
soon.
Our analysis suggests that when the ﬁrm’s initial
variance as well as the initial mean viability are both
low, pizza-bin would be the logical choice. When the
ﬁrm’s initial estimate of viability is high, however,
the ps technology deserves more serious considera-
tion through a ﬂexible design approach. When the
initial variance of viability is also high, SD is more
appropriate because the time taken to achieve conver-
gence would be expensive under the PP approach but
SD does not involve a marginal cost of deliberation.
When the initial variance of viability is low, PP may
be appropriate because of the lower time required to
reach convergence. These are, however, general direc-
tional guidelines, and the exact approach pursued
depends on a number of parameters including the
length of the development and life cycles, proﬁtabil-
ity of the pv and ps technologies, and the coefﬁcients
of reversion.
5.1. Illustration: Product Deﬁnition Under
Technology Uncertainty at Dell
We now revisit the Dell laptop situation described in
§1. It is noteworthy that the development team chose
to commit to the lithium-ion technology right away.
The battery supplier was eventually able to control
the lithium-ion overcharging problem, so the decision
to go with lithium-ion technology led to a success-
ful product that brought Dell back into the portable
market in the 1990s. In retrospect, the decision served
them well, but the decision was fraught with risks
and Dell could have achieved the upside from the
lithium-ion battery without the signiﬁcant downside
risk of up-front commitment by adopting the PP or
SD approach. Based on data collected from Dell and
other industry sources, we also examine the proﬁt
from the two ﬂexible approaches to see which would
have been more appropriate to the Dell context.
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Dell enjoyed a sizeable 2.5% of the market of world-
wide portable market before the product ﬁasco dis-
cussed in §1 which brought down the market share
(to 1%). The team expected that if it developed a qual-
ity product with pv technologies, it could recapture
a share of the market mpv equal to 2.5%. Addition-
ally, if the team were able to launch a product that
is differentiated along a differentiating feature (such
as battery life), it could hope to recapture a greater
share of the worldwide market mpp equal to 3%. The
market size (M) was expected to be about 33 million
units for the time period 1995–1997 (from IDC data).
The product development cycle length Tdev was 18
months, and the life-cycle length TLf was estimated to
be 36 months. The estimated cost of developing a new
product at Dell is $10 million with six reviews/gates
to approve further investments. If the team picked the
LIon technology and later discovered that it had to
revert to the pv NiHi technology, we found from our
interviews that it would have to rework about 30%
portion of the work ( =  = 03). We roughly esti-
mated the team’s conﬁdence level (v0) associated with
the viability of the lithium-ion technology to be about
0.6, because three of the ﬁve battery-savvy developers
in the team believed LIon technology would be viable
at launch, while two viewed it to be not viable.
The average gross margin for the new product dur-
ing its three-year life cycle (1995–1997) was expected
to be $600. The Dell team wanted to grow the demand
and its share of the market with the new product
keeping same margins. So, gross margin associated
with the LIon product was also $600 (average), but
Dell’s market share was expected to increase from
2.5% to 3%. Using the above data, the gross proﬁt
associated with the NiHi product for the three-year
life cycle = 33 million units ∗ 600 margin/unit ∗
2.5% = $495 million. The gross proﬁt associated with
the LIon product for the three-year life cycle 33 mil-
lion units ∗ 600 margin/unit ∗ 2.5% = $594 million.
Case (a). The development team uses the pizza-bin
approach (rejects LIon outright and goes with NiHi
battery technology. With the NiHi product alone, the
team can make a net proﬁt of $485 million (gross
proﬁt of $495 million—$10 million development cost).
However, if LIon technology proves to be viable at
launch, the team can develop and launch a follow-up
product with LIon 18 months (one cycle) after the ﬁrst
product is launched. In this case (which occurs with a
probability of 0.6), the total expected net proﬁt= $509
million (using (7) in §3).
Case (b). The development team can pick LIon tech-
nology outright (as it eventually did). Using expres-
sion (8), the net proﬁt from this choice comes out to
be $513.5 million. Note the signiﬁcant downside asso-
ciated with this approach. There is a 40% chance the
ﬁrm will be late to market with a NiHi product, dam-
aging its reputation and signiﬁcantly lowering proﬁts.
Case (c). Instead of committing at the beginning,
the team could decide to be ﬂexible and try the PP
option. While we could apply the analysis of §4 to this
case, it is interesting to note that the gross proﬁts in
this case are signiﬁcantly larger than the cost of devel-
opment. Even if the team pursues the parallel path
for the entire duration, the net proﬁt would equal
06 ∗ 574+ 04 ∗ 475 = $534 million. If the team termi-
nates the PP earlier, the proﬁt could be even higher.
Also, the downside risk is signiﬁcantly reduced.
Case (d). The team could overdesign the product
so that it could function with either technology. The
engineers estimated the increase in unit variable cost
and the resulting increase in size would reduce the
gross margins by about $12 (or 2%). The net expected
proﬁt from this case is given by 06 ∗ 098∗$584 mil-
lion + 0.4 ∗ 0.98 ∗ $485 million = $5335 million.
Both the SD and the PP approach achieve nearly
the same expected proﬁt assuming the PP do not ter-
minate until the very end of the development process.
PP would be more attractive if the team could ter-
minate the alternate path earlier. However, PP cannot
be shown to converge earlier using (14) because the
critical value  (from (16)) is negative. Dell was also
severely cash-constrained at this time, so sufﬁcient
design might have been more appropriate as it does
not require immediate cash outlays. Either way, the
ﬂexible design approaches would have signiﬁcantly
reduced the downside risk while offering an attractive
return compared to outright commitment.
5.2. Limitations and Future Work
Our model in this paper was deliberately stylized to
keep the attention focused on obtaining insights. We
made a number of modeling assumptions that need to
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be relaxed in future work, so we review some of the
key assumptions here. First, we assumed for tractabil-
ity that the ﬁrm faced the choice of one pv and one
ps technology. Second, we have considered demand
dynamics during the life cycle, but have ignored
the effects of demand uncertainty, which must be
considered in future research. Also, the cumulative
demand distributions for both the pv and ps tech-
nology are assumed to be the same for tractabil-
ity reasons, which may not be the case in prac-
tice. We also did not consider the ﬂexibility offered
by the SD option for upgrading the product with
the pv technology to the ps technology in the next
generation.
In performing the analysis of convergence, we have
assumed that the ﬁrm did not incur the cost of col-
lecting information (which was borne by a supplier),
and the prior information and market signals formed
a conjugate pair so that posterior information is of
the same distribution as the prior information. In par-
ticular, we assumed a particular form (Beta-Bernoulli
pair) for the prior and the signal. Also, the ﬁrm being
modeled was essentially a monopolist, so future work
should consider the effects of competition as well as
market diversity in studying technology selection and
product deﬁnition under technology uncertainty.
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